



To date, pension debates and pension reforms
have primarily dealt with the way the pension
claim is produced, and have almost completely
ignored that it is not enough to meticulously
add the claims to the pension, because we can-
not do anything with the countless claims if in
the meantime a new generation is not brought
up from which the claims can actually be col-
lected. Modern pension systems hardly
acknowledge raising children (with 1–2% of
the pension). This contributes to a decline in
the willingness to have children and thus to the
ageing of the population. According to our
intention, this situation would be corrected by
the allowance paid by children in mothers’ pen-
sions as presented in this article. Its main
source would be a pre-determined portion of
the contribution paid by their children for a
pre-determined period of time. In contrast to
other similar proposals, our proposal requires
children to contribute to the provisions for
pensions with their contributions, as this way
not only pension claims would be produced
after children but their source as well. 
To facilitate implementation we developed a
model adjusted to domestic demographic and
public finance conditions in which approxi-
mately one quarter of the pension expendi-
tures spent on women would be received by
mothers as allowance paid by their employed
children. At the end of the article an impact
assessment in which the parameters of the
model (employment, fertility, number of peo-
ple entitled to widow’s pension) are changed is
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also described, and the applicability of our sys-
tem in various scenarios is also presented. Of
course, the best proof of the success of the
model would be if it entailed an improvement
in both productivity and employment.
Namely, the serious funds pensions entail indi-
cate to parents and their children alike that the
pension system works in a generational chain.
Neither party may forget about their interde-
pendence. Goethe expressed the deep philoso-
phy of it in an even more concise manner than
scientists specialising in the subject: “Into the
whole how all things blend, Each in the other
working, living! How heavenly powers ascend,
descend, Each unto each the golden vessels
giving!” (Goethe: Faust, 1980)
RAISING CHILDREN AND PENSIONS
In today’s Hungary, with its pension contribu-
tions paid to the pension fund, a couple of par-
ents of the productive generation make a con-
tribution of some HUF 50 million to the pub-
lic pension fund of its generation. At the same
time, if they bring up two children, they con-
tribute an additional “investment” of HUF 65
million to the pension system (assuming that
the children will work and pay contributions,
the chance of which is just over 50% assuming
today’s employment situation remains
unchanged). 
Today, the cost of raising one child is HUF
30–35 million (if the payments to the budget by
the family are added to the family expenditures
in proportion to the fiscal expenditures spent on
the child, and if the work spent on the children
is also expressed in forints in line with the rele-
vant statistical standards). Accordingly, a couple
of parents that brings up two children facilitates
future production and makes a contribution
with an investment of HUF 65 million to the
Hungarian “pension economy” of the future. 
In light of all the above, today, when the pen-
sion system is being retailored, it should be an
important aspect that the system also acknowl-
edge (as a form of value creation and pension
investment) the raising of children by families
and the help provided to children for them to
find their way in the labour market.1
The generational correlations of providing
for the elderly were obscured by the Bismarck
pension model. Several generations have grown
up with the false belief that the pension system
can be rendered independent of the reproduc-
tivity of families.2
The two-generation family model evolved as
a result of modernity and family strategies
adjusting to industrial structures.3 As a conse-
quence of the narrowing of intergenerational
family ties, a pension system facilitating old-
age provision has become necessary.4
Seen from today’s perspective, the introduction
was not too difficult. Namely, one must not for-
get that 100 hundred years ago pensions were a
“reward” for a small number of people who lived
long lives. Therefore, low contributions were
sufficient, as (contrary to the current situation)
few people lived long enough to reach retire-
ment age, and even fewer of them could enjoy
their pension for a subsequent 10–15–20 years.
The characteristic features of classical pen-
sion systems are that they: 
• concentrate on the individual, disregarding
family or generational reproduction,
• are (mostly) financed from contributions
as a proportion of earnings,
• acknowledge that higher earnings ensure
eligibility for a higher pension,
• generally implement a smaller or greater
redistribution (on social grounds, as an
acknowledgement of the burden on
women in connection with having chil-
dren, and due to pressures from various
interest groups).  PUBLIC FINANCES
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Two basic models are generally mentioned.
One of them is the pay-as-you-earn system, the
other is the pay-as-you-go system. Within that,
there are at least 8–9 important aspects for clas-
sifying the individual subtypes. It is difficult to
change any pension system, not only due to
professional considerations (due to their com-
plicated nature and prolonged introduction),
but politically as well, as doing so affects rights
that were acquired during decades.
It is typical of these models (and regrettable)
that laying the foundation of old-age provision
and raising children are separated from one
another. 
EUROPEAN PENSIONS: 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SOME YEARS
OF CHILD-RAISING 
In the last two decades, European systems
responded to the decline in the number of
births and to the rapid ageing of the popula-
tion5 (as well as the resulting higher demand
for pensions and fewer payers) in two ways:
• they reduced the value of later pensions,
with various amendments;
[Taking into account the individual’s aver-
age earning in the period instead of the
years of high earnings, higher retirement
age, lower multipliers upon establishing
the value of the pension, general reduction
of the pension level in the case of an
increase in life expectancy (and according-
ly in the demand for pensions) etc.] 
• in determining the pension amount they
take into consideration that on account of
raising children a mother can be employed
for a shorter period of time. Nowadays, in
the majority of European countries a por-
tion of the time spent raising an infant is
already acknowledged in calculating the
value of the pension. The following three
methods are applied:
 up to a certain level (for example up to
the minimum wage or the value of earli-
er earnings) the state pays the pension
contribution due to the pension fund
instead of the individual,
 1–3 years of the time spent raising an
infant is taken into account as if the
mother had worked,
[It has a similar effect that in countries
where pensions are determined on the
basis of a point system (for example in
Germany and Norway), some (1–3)
years of the time spent raising a child are
taken into account with a higher than
usual index number.]
 1–3 years (per child) of the period spent
raising children are included in the mini-
mum time required for pension eligibility.6
The usual result of the methods presented
here is that the pension of the parent concerned
(generally the mother, but in some countries the
father as well) is increased by 2–4% in the case of
one child and by 3–8% in the case of two chil-
dren.7  Overall, as a result of the corrections
applied, the total pension of women may increase
by some 2–5%. While a saving of as much as
20–25% could be achieved by restraining expen-
diture requirements, the allowances related to
the acknowledgement of the time spent raising
children may have reached a mere 1–2% within
the total spending on pensions in the countries
concerned. It means that according to the figures
the steps taken in the second direction received a
much more subordinate role.
What is positive in the aforementioned cor-
rections is that they acknowledge: 1–3 years
per child are lost from the employment career
of the parent on account of bringing the child
up. At the same time, it is not taken into
account that bringing up a child requires much
more sacrifice than those few years spent rais-
ing a growing infant. Much more self-sacrifice
is required of parents in terms of care, upbring-
ing and finances as well.8 PUBLIC FINANCES 
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The above described adjustments of the pen-
sion system do not proportionately take
account of the negative effect of the demo-
graphic impact – the ageing of the population –
on the pension system. A higher number of
children – in parallel with adequate employ-
ment – would considerably rev up the deceler-
ated growth of economies and add to the rev-
enues of general governments. Relative to this
magnitude, we cannot consider a 1–2% adjust-
ment of the pension system in connection with
raising children as really generous.
If – for example, as a result of amendments to
the pension system encouraging people to have
children and facilitating employment – the
number of children in Hungary grew by 9 thou-
sand every year, in 20 years annual general gov-
ernment revenues could increase by as much as
HUF 100–120 billion p.a. This is a magnitude
for which we believe it is worth “tuning” the
demographic message of the pension system to
a more vigorous level than is presently the case.
This is what we are proposing.
TAKING DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS INTO
CONSIDERATION – THEORETICAL
ASPECTS
Earlier, within Europe there were larger-scale
proposals pointing in other directions as well,
but they were ultimately not accepted.
In Germany, the expectation that those who
raise fewer offspring should receive allowances
only in the case that a higher pension contribu-
tion is introduced arose as far back as 55 years
ago. The proposal and its refusal by Chancellor
Adenauer are discussed in detail in several papers
and presentations by Katalin Botos.
Tamás Mészáros mentions numerous authors
according to whom the raising of offspring
should also be taken into account in determin-
ing pensions. One of them is of the opinion that
the considerable decline in the number of births
in the developed world is attributable to pension
systems.
Below is a list of the main questions encoun-
tered by those who would like to take account
of the demographic factor as well during the
adjustment of a pension system.
What percentage of the total pension
should depend on demographic factors?
Should regulation stick to an age-group
approach9 (comparing generations – holding
them “responsible” vis-à-vis one another), or
“descend” to the level of the individual or fam-
ily (more specifically, should it take into
account the number of children brought up by
the given person)?
Should the allowance depend on the num-
ber of working children or on the earnings of
the child as well?
Should the mother receive the genera-
tional pension or the father as well?
Should it be taken into account whether
the child is gainfully employed and/or whether
(s)he is raising any (grand)children?
What is the source of the allowance?
Should it operate as a pay-as-you-go or as
a pay-as-you-earn system? 
Is it also intended to improve the employ-
ment opportunities of those who are raising
children (for example, via a lower social securi-
ty contribution)?
How is it advisable to operate the pro-
posed system? As a part of the existing systems
or in parallel with them?
In addition, it is a question whether with the
amendments the new system should adopt the
“paying individual – then the community mak-
ing good use of the contributions – finally the
individual granted the allocation” basic scheme,
or it should create a (specific) quantifiable pen-
sion relationship between the individual and
his/her family. Even in a way that a significant
portion of this relationship would be organised PUBLIC FINANCES
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without the involvement of a public (or finan-
cial) participant.
PROPOSAL FOR ALLOWANCE PAID BY
CHILDREN
10
According to the proposal drawn up in this
article, the demographic factor should be taken
into account in a way that a specified amount
would be credited under this pretext to a sepa-
rated account covered by children from the
contributions of the (already working) chil-
dren. Those parents (mainly mothers in this
scheme) who have brought up tax-paying citi-
zens would receive provisions from this
account.11
The child-based pension element would
acknowledge child-raising activity as a month-
ly fixed amount (a lump sum) in the mother’s
pension (assuming her child has worked a spec-
ified number of years). The allowance would be
adjusted to the number of children.
The provision should be tied to whether the child
“has produced” the parent’s child-based pension
entitlement by the age of 37, i.e. if the child has
worked a sufficient number of years and paid
enough contributions to entitle the mother to the
pension element covered by her child. 
The child-based pension element would be
of a pay-as-you-go type. Its source could be a
given portion of the pension contribution paid
after the child. Preferably it would be a fixed
amount (for example, the extent of the contri-
bution due after 15% of the average earning,
i.e. HUF 10 thousand per month), which
would be paid to the mother by the child
brought up, until he/she reaches the age of –
let’s say – 37. The mother, in turn, would
receive a monthly allowance of HUF 12 thou-
sand after each working child. According to
our calculations detailed below, in which we
took account of Hungarian fertility rates and
the expected employment of young people,
this would mean an average annual allowance
for a mother of HUF 144 thousand per child.
Relative to this amount, more would be grant-
ed to those who have more children the level of
employment of which is higher than average,
and less would be received by those who have
fewer children than average the employment of
which is lower. (Our calculation presenting the
effects on the general government also con-
tains a proposal for the budgetary source of
funding for the additional allowance resulting
from the introduction of the child-based pen-
sion element.)
According to the proposal, the beneficiary
of the greater portion of the child-based pen-
sion element is the mother. The underlying
justification is that women – as they are the
ones who bear the brunt of raising children –
can pay less to the pension system consisting
of pension contributions; therefore, the pen-
sion determined for them will be disadvanta-
geous.12 The system proposed by us is able to
rectify this unfavourable situation by means of
a work-based approach13 (as opposed to the
existing, nearly impossible to follow egalitari-
an system).
Allowance should be allotted to the father if
the mother is deceased or it was the father who
brought up the child for a greater portion (for
example two thirds) of the period until the age
of 18. 
On average, the allowance would amount to
10–15% of women’s old-age income.
It is desirable that the state guarantee the
allowance paid by children – as it is guaranteed
in the case of pensions based on individual con-
tributions. This would be the guarantee that
based on the contributions paid to the genera-
tional pension fund parents are sure to receive
the pension supplement. The allowances would PUBLIC FINANCES 
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be adjusted for inflation, the funds for which
would be ensured by the increase in the contri-
bution paid.
SPECIFIC FIGURES
The child-based pension element would pro-
vide an average monthly allowance of HUF 12
thousand for the mother who has already
reached retirement age, after each child who
works 13 years until the age of 37 (the
allowance would be HUF 900 for each year
worked by the child , i.e. based on an average
working time of 13 years it would amount to
HUF 12 thousand per child). Table 1 shows the
planned value of the allowance according to the
number of years worked by the child. 
Of course, in atypical situations it would be
possible to apply individual solutions, different
from the ones described above.
For example, if the mother gives birth at the age
of 40–42, and her child only starts working at the
age of 23 (for example after graduation), upon the
mother’s retirement the allowance received after
the child could be determined with the condition
that the final value of the pension supplement
would be determined, let’s say, after five years –
depending on the number of years the child is
gainfully employed in the remaining five years.
The source of the allowance paid by children:
the pension contribution (currently: 10% +
23.5%) after the (first) HUF 30 thousand
(15% of the average earning) of the monthly
earnings of those under the age of 37 would be
credited to a separated account.
Tabli 1
THE VALUE OF THE MOTHER'S CHILD-BASED PENSION ELEMENT ACCORDING TO 
THE NUMBER OF YEARS WORKED BY THE CHILD UNTIL THEY TURN 37












Notes:  It should be defined how many months of employment would be required for a year to be taken into consideration as working time. It would
be advisable to set it somewhere in the region of 10–11 months, with the condition that any shorter time worked can be taken into account in sub-
sequent years. Accordingly, if the child has worked 8 months, no allowance would be due for the given year, but these 8 months would be added to
the working time of the next year (for example, if the number of months worked in the next year is once again 8, allowance would be due for that
year for the 16 months, and 4 months could be „rolled over” to the next year).
A female child receiving maternity leave payment (i.e. who worked before childbirth) should be taken into account as a working person. It should be
considered a whole year if someone with a child not older than 6 years of age works part-time following a period of receiving maternity leave payment.
If the mother has daughters, the value of the generational pension element after them would be relatively speaking lower on account of them raising
their children (i.e. the grandchildren). Correction could be applied for this situation as well.
Source: own calculation PUBLIC FINANCES
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“COMPETITION” BETWEEN THE
ALLOWANCE PAID BY CHILDREN 
AND THE WIDOW’S PENSION
The pension system has to adjust itself to the
fact that an increasing number of women are
employed. In the current system, the reward
for a woman who devotes much time to her
family is that when her husband, who earned
more money with the help of his wife (as well),
dies, the wife receives widow’s benefits after
her husband. The system also acknowledges
the role of the full-time wife by giving a
widow’s pension as the main allowance to
those women who have not been employed (if
their husband dies). The child-based pension
element would provide nearly the same remu-
neration for a woman devoting much time to
her family. However, this would be done with
an allowance granted after children. Namely,
the difference between widow’s pensions and
the child-based pension element would be that
the latter would not recompense women who
do not bring up children.
The multipliers and parameters applied upon
determining widow’s pensions should be
changed in a way that the new widow’s pen-
sions drop to one quarter of today’s level. Thus
the funding for the child-based pension ele-
ment may partly come from the reduction of
the role of the widow’s pension.
WHICH AGE GROUP SHOULD BE USED
TO LAUNCH THE PROPOSED SYSTEM? 
Series of generations have adjusted (and are
still adjusting) their individual life strategies to
the existing pension system. According to our
proposal, the age limit of 37–38 years is a point
at which women could still have a choice and
chance to adjust. Namely, (calculating with the
new system) a woman under the age of 40 can
still decide to:
• have one or even two children,
• slightly postpone devoting herself to her
own career and instead spend more time
raising her existing children so that they
have a better chance of finding a job (soci-
ological surveys suggest that the mother
plays a decisive role in the developments of
the child’s labour market career),
• engage in a partial “competition” between
assisting the child in his/her career path
and paving the way for the husband’s (life-
partner’s) career (more of the human
resources of the family would be allotted
to the new generation).
Analysed from the aspect of compliance
between allowances and contributions, com-
pared to the classical systems, the achievement of
the proposed system could be the “reinclusion”
of family-level compliance (or equivalence in the
language of the pension literature) in old-age
provisions. Namely, indirectly or through trans-
missions, a portion of the contribution after the
earnings of children would finance their parents’
provisions. In terms of content, redistribution
would be lower – the net amount of contribu-
tions collected on earnings would decline.
Perhaps the best term to describe the above
would be equivalence “within the family”.14
SUPPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS
Supplementary elements are also applied in
addition to the classical pension systems. From
this aspect, the system “covered by children”
would perform better. Namely, there are two
groups of those who are not provided for in the
pension system.  One of the groups ends up in
this situation because they bring up children,
the other because they cannot (or do not even
want to) find a job. The problem of the former
is solved by the proposals in question (if the
raised child is gainfully employed); therefore,
in the case of the new systems it is only for the PUBLIC FINANCES 
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second group that some kind of supplementary
public system needs to be found. Presumably,
the number of those in this latter group would
also decline, as the proposed system would
encourage family members to take on express-
ly legal employment.
Of course, the system containing the pro-
posed child-based pension element will not
create extreme disproportions only if it applies
supplementary elements as well. 
First of all, one of them is the treatment of
the number of children. Depending on the
number of children, it would be advisable to
apply a principle of slight degression.
Compared to the child-based pension after the
first and second children, the provision of the
generational pension after the third child (and
subsequent children) could be some 80% of the
amount after the first two children.
Separate treatment is needed in the case of
women who are not eligible for a reasonable
pension (for example those who do not have a
child).
THE EFFECTS OF INTRODUCING THE
CHILD-BASED PENSION
Below is a presentation of the effect of the pro-
posed system on public finances and on the
pension amounts of the population concerned.
During our impact assessments, we prepared
estimates for the expected number of children
and their employment based on the demo-
graphic data of the population. This is how we
established the amount of the annual pension
burden on the general government that will
have to be paid on account of child-based pen-
sions. We compared this amount to the amount
by which widow’s pensions would decline
according to our calculations/proposal. The
difference between the two constitutes the
effect on the balance of the general govern-
ment. According to our calculations, the effect
on the balance would be slightly negative in the
years following the introduction, and would be
positive in the last five years. The deficit caused
would amount to approximately HUF 2 billion
per year, increasing to HUF 12 billion by the
seventh year. Then the deficit would decline,
and at the end of the 20th year the general gov-
ernment would close with a surplus of HUF 17
billion. In our chart, this is illustrated by the
curve of the effect on the general government
balance, which visibly moves in the vicinity of
the zero level, initially in the negative, then in
the positive domain.
A surplus for the general government means a
decline in the pension amount of the population
concerned. Considering that our calculations
reflect only certain probabilities (developments
in fertility, mortality and employment), the rele-
vance of the given calculations is that it shows:
with the probabilities foreseeable today, the sys-
tem proposed by us does not have a significant
impact on public finances, and the amount of
pension to be paid can be “maintained” from the
aspect of the population as well. 
In addition to the effect on the general gov-
ernment balance, Chart 1 also depicts the
processes that explain this balance effect –
including the expected developments in widow’s
pensions if the existing system remains. This is
followed by a presentation of the reduction in
the widow’s pension proposed by us. This is
compared to the amounts that would be granted
as an additional allowance, as child-based pen-
sion to the persons thus entitled (according to
the number of children and their employment).
Special emphasis is laid upon how the popula-
tion would eventually be affected by the change
(the curve of the new, combined pension
amount in the chart), i.e. how these two pension
elements (the widow’s pension and the pension
provided on the basis of employed children’s
contributions) change together. PUBLIC FINANCES
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The chart clearly shows that the curve of the
pensions paid together following the introduc-
tion of the child-based pension system (new,
combined pension amount) closely mirrors the
curve of the amount of widow’s pension pro-
jected according to the present system.
Disbursements in the new system would
roughly correspond to the disbursements
anticipated in the present system. Accordingly,
in line with the funding forecast financing of
the child-based pension is viable.
It can also be seen that in the years follow-
ing the introduction the population would
receive slightly more in the new system
(widow’s pensions would decline to a lesser
extent than the increase in the child-based
pension), then, after some time this effect is
rather negative. Adding up the annual surplus-
es and losses, the population’s pension balance
would close with a surplus. 
However, it was not taken into account in
these calculations that as a result of the
demog-raphic “message” of the new pension
system, willingness to have children as well as
the employment of children may also increase.
All this would have a favourable impact on
GDP growth and employment and, through
that, on the equilibrium of the pension system
as well.
The main figures of our system are as fol-
lows. 
General government expenditure due to the
child-based pension element is expected to be
around HUF 138 billion. Savings as a result 
of the decline in widow’s pensions are expect-
ed to amount to some HUF 155 billion.
Accordingly, the balance for the 20th year is
already positive (as is the case for some years
before that as well). However, the deficits and
surpluses of the 20 years together represent a
negative general government balance, albeit to
an almost negligible extent: HUF 2.8 billion as
an annual average. (And it has not yet been
taken into account here that the expected
Chart 1
OFFICE AND THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL PENSION INSURANCE
Source: own calculation and estimate based on data of the Central Statistical Office and the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance PUBLIC FINANCES 
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increase in the number of births would defi-
nitely add to the revenues of the state.) 
From the population’s perspective the devel-
opments in deficits and surpluses constitute a
mirror image of those of the general govern-
ment. Initially they may realise a pension surplus;
subsequently, the end of the period will be char-
acterised by a deficit. Due to the insignificant
balance effects vis-à-vis the general government
and the population, our model producing the
above results is referred to as the basic version.
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
Compared to the above described basic version,
we also carried out calculations on how the bal-
ance of the impact on public finances would
change if the number of those entitled to a
widow’s pension would change even more
unfavourably than in the basic version (more wid-
ows would lose their pension eligibility due to
their dependents’ even less favourable than
assumed employment). We also took into account
that relative to the present amounts the size of
widow’s pensions may decrease, as a result of the
decline in the proportion of those who receive a
widow’s pension by their own right. We also took
account of two versions for fertility: fertility
declines to a level below the present one or, on the
contrary, exceeds the present level (precisely as a
result of the child-based pension element). 
Table 2 shows how the changes in the values
of individual parameters impact the general
government balance.
Main results
It will entail no material consequences com-
pared to our basic model if fewer widows are
eligible for widow’s pension. If employment is
less favourable than assumed, the number of
those eligible for widow’s pension will be
Table 2
ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE CHILD-BASED PENSION ELEMENT ON PUBLIC
FINANCES ASSUMING VARIOUS PARAMETERS
Fertility Employment Proportion of  Balance Balance calculated
rate (25–39 years those eligible summed up for the last year
of age), for widow’s for 20 years, (cumulative value),
% pension, % HUF billion HUF billion
Basic   version 1,32 75 90 –56 17
Fewer persons eligible
for widow’s pension 1,32 68 80 –82 13
Lower average
widow’s pension 1,32 75 80 –145 9
Higher average 
widow’s pension 1,32 75 80 34 23
Fewe children 
born 1,18 75 80 136 32




Source: own calculation and estimate based on data of the Central Statistical Office and the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance PUBLIC FINANCES
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lower, but the number of those entitled to
child-based pensions will also probably be
lower. Namely, in this case it can be assumed
that their children’s level of employment will
also be low, and therefore expenditures for
child-based pensions will also decline.
Our table shows that with the given parame-
ters the “most favourable” scenario for the gen-
eral government is seemingly if few children
are born (the calculated balance surplus is the
highest here: HUF 32 billion). By contrast, it is
the most unfavourable if more children are
born; then the balance surplus is the lowest. 
However, this model does not take into
account that the economy is not indifferent to
demographic changes. An increase in the num-
ber of children and strong motivation to be
employed facilitate economic growth, and
improve the balance of the general government
and within that the balance of the pension sys-
tem. 
The last line in our table also takes into
account the indirect effects. Due to the
increase in employment, the surplus of the gen-
eral government is HUF 59 billion in the last
year, i.e. higher than in any other version.
(Over the long term, the amount of revenues
may increase by as much as HUF 100–120 bil-
lion annually due to the higher number of
those who work.) 
THE MODE OF TAKING DEMOGRAPHIC
ASPECTS INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR MODEL
In a previous part of this article we raised ques-
tions on the basis of the answers to which the
systems that intend to take account of demo-
graphic aspects operate. Here is a summary of
how the model outlined by us addresses the
correlations raised. 
What percentage of the total pension
should depend on demographic factors?
In the proposed model, around 8–10% of
pensions depend on demographic factors (as
opposed to the general figure of 1–2%).
Accordingly, it places much greater emphasis
on demographic aspects.
Should regulation continue to retain an
age-group approach (comparing generations –
holding them “responsible” vis-à-vis one
another), or “descend” to the level of the indi-
vidual or family (more specifically, should it
take into account the number of children
brought up by the given person)? 
Our model makes a portion of the pension
dependent on family reproduction, i.e. it partly
returns the provision for the conditions of old-
age security from the generational to family
level.
Should the allowance depend on the num-
ber of working children or on the earnings of
the child as well? 
Our model also makes a part of old-age pro-
vision dependent on children’s productive
activity (employment), the message of which is
that productive children provide the coverage
for their parents’ pension.
Should the mother receive the genera-
tional pension or the father as well?
In our model, it is mainly the mother who
receives the child-based pension, taking
account of the social context of raising children
in Hungary, i.e. the fact that the burden is pri-
marily on the mother.
Should it be taken into account whether
the child is gainfully employed and/or whether
(s)he is raising any (grand)children?
In our proposal, the definite answer to this
question is that the pension system should take
into account the employment of children, as
this is the only way to produce the real econo-
my coverage for the virtual pension.
What is the source of the allowance?
The source of the child-based pension ele-
ment is the direct restructuring of the widow’s
pension system and the more emphatic
acknowledgement of raising children – than of PUBLIC FINANCES 
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the spousal(like) relationship – in the pension
system.
The other more important – indirect –
source: an increase in the number of children
and the motivation to be employed (and pay
taxes) could result in considerable GDP
growth as high as 7–8% from the present
3–4%. Consequently, general government rev-
enues could also increase. 
Should it operate as a pay-as-you-go or as
a pay-as-you-earn system?
Our model assumes a pay-as-you-go system,
as it is easier to incorporate it into the existing
pension system. 
How is it advisable to operate the pro-
posed system? As a part of the existing systems
or in parallel with them?
Our proposal would complement the pres-
ent system with a child-based element. The
underlying consideration is that it could as well
be introduced immediately15 (with an inductive
system) and could solve the adjustment to the
new demographic aspects within the system
more smoothly and with fewer significant
shocks within the system.
AND THE RESULT OBTAINED – CHANGE
IN THE PENSION VALUE SYSTEM: “PENSION
ON PAPER” VS. CHILD-BASED PENSION
Pension debates and pension systems concentrate
on the generation of individual contribution
based pension claims and the ways of handling
them. However, they ignore that the produc-
tive generation produces its pension in another
way as well, namely, by raising the generation
that will perform productive work exactly at
the time when the earlier generation stops
working. No matter in what system the pen-
sion claims are accounted for, their actual 
coverage is provided by none other than the
coming active generation itself. This is the only
way the “pension on paper” can turn into
actual consumption by pensioners, the means
of subsistence of the generation that brings up
the grandchildren. 
The so-called child-based pension system
would not only be financially fairer, but would
also be more efficient from a demographical
point of view. Although the total amount 
of pension contributions would remain
unchanged, a considerable portion within that
would practically remain within the family, i.e.
it would no longer be a deprivation in terms of
content.
With the fact that the present pension sys-
tem does not, or barely, take(s) child-raising
into account in pension-age subsistence, it
contributes considerably to demographic dis-
tortion, i.e. to the opinion that “it is not
worth” having children. This message of the
pension system needs urgently to be termi-
nated. This is what we intended to contribute
to with a more detailed presentation of our
own model.
ANNEX
PARAMETERS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE IMPACT ANALYSIS
The parameters of the impact analysis pre-
sented have been set considering the following
(this is our basic version, compared to which
other versions are also described later). 
The number of women over the age of 65
The data of the age pyramid were taken into
account for women born between 1974 and PUBLIC FINANCES
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1994. We assumed that 5% of the present pop-
ulation will die before reaching the age of 65.
According to these calculations, 18–20 years
later the population of females born after 1974
will be 900–950 thousand people. 
The number of women receiving
widow’s pensions
The number of widows for the 20 years follow-
ing introduction was deduced from the number
of women above the age of 65 years calculated
as described above. 
In a breakdown by age group (e.g. 44% of
65–70 year olds, but 68% of 75–80 year olds),
we assumed that the proportion of widows
among women will be similar to the one at
present. Thus we can specify the number of
widows for each year.
We assumed that 90% of widows will receive
a widow’s pension. Accordingly, we assume
that 10% will not receive a widow’s pension.
This is three to four times the current rate. The
underlying reason is that a considerable
increase is expected in the number of those
whose husbands (life-companions) will not be
eligible for pensions (because they have not
worked 20 years by the age of 65), thus no
widow’s pension will be due following the
death of the husband.
In the final analysis – with this calculation –
by the end of the 20th year 500–550 thousand
women would receive widow’s pensions
according to the present conditions.
An amount of HUF 390 thousand was taken
into account as the annual value of a widow’s
pension. (This amount was calculated based on
the average widow’s pension in 2009 (HUF 32
thousand per month), multiplied by the average
pension index of the last two years.) 
As one tenth of widows are not expected to
receive a widow’s pension, the present expendi-
ture item of HUF 270 billion will decline to
HUF 207 billion. 
If, according to the proposal, its value was
reduced to one quarter of the present figure, it
would result in a HUF 155 billion fall in
expenditure (from the expenditure of HUF
207 billion). 
Number of children
Taking account of the average fertility rate of
1.31 and assuming an average rate of 75%
employment in the case of the growing chil-
dren, the result is that pension-age women born
after 1974 may receive an average of HUF 143
thousand per year in the above described sys-
tem. (The starting amount is HUF 12 thou-
sand/child/month. Although it is increased by
the number of children, employment declined,
thus practically the average child-based pension
corresponds to the amount after one child on
average.) Accordingly, with this calculation,
expenditures for child-based pensions would
amount to approximately HUF 125–135 billion
by the end of the 20th year.
Interpretation of employment
Only the employment of those between the
ages of 25–45 counts in our model. The
employment of those over the age of 50 does
not count because by then the mother’s child-
based pension has long been fixed. The employ-
ment of those aged between the ages of 18 and
23 does not count because until the mother
turns 65 it is sufficient to have worked 12 years;
the child can do so even if he/she starts work-
ing at the age of 25 (at which point the mother
of an average child is 52 years old).
From all this it follows that in terms of
expected employment the proposed system has PUBLIC FINANCES 
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set more easily attainable parameters for those
with lower education (thus practically compen-
sating their lower level of employment). While
graduates have 13–15 years to work 12 years
for their old-age mothers to receive the total
value of the child-based pension, someone who
has finished eight years of schooling and is able
to work at the age of 16 has to work 12 years
out of 20–22 years to provide for the mother’s
pension. 
In addition, maternity leave payment also
counts as employment. The number of those
receiving maternity leave payment is 95 thou-
sand. Presumably, the overwhelming majority
of them are above the age of 25 (the average age
of mothers at the time of the first childbirth is
26.5 years). 
As far as the child-based pension is con-
cerned, 92% employment is equivalent to
100% (because once the child has worked 12
years out of 13, the mother receives the full
child-based pension). Therefore, for our
purposes, the present statistical value of
69% for the employment of those between
the ages of 25 and 45 corresponds to a value
of 75%.
Changed parameters of vulnerability
analyses
Lower employment
Our specific parameters: fewer women – a
mere 80% of widows (not 90%) – receive a
widow’s pension.  According to the modelling,
the financial balance does not change signifi-
cantly even in the case of this 80% proportion.
Namely, if the number of those ineligible to
receive a pension due to low employment is
increased, the assumed 75% proportion of their
children’s employment also has to be reduced
(Table 2 shows that we reduced it to 68%). It
means that the amount of the child-based pen-
sion will also be lower.
Change in the average value of pensions
The value of pensions is mostly influenced by
the proportion of those who receive widow’s
pension by their own right (not as a supple-
ment). This proportion is currently 17%. If
their proportion deviates from it by 5 percent-
age points in any direction, through the reduc-
tion of widow’s pensions to one quarter, the
“saving” attainable by the state is
increased/reduced by an annual average
amount of HUF 4.5 billion. Its impact on the
general government balance would change by
the same amount.
Changes to fertility parameters 
First we reduced fertility to 1.18, then
increased it to 1.4 in the other version. 
In the event that even fewer children are
born than at present, a lower amount of child-
based pension has to be paid, which results in
an improvement in the general government
balance. However, if other factors are also
taken account of, the situation is just the
opposite of the above, as in this case fewer
people work, which causes a significant
decline in the employment-related revenues of
the state. 
Accordingly, if the fertility rate is 1.18, the
number of children born is fewer by 9 thou-
sand every year, and by the end of the 20th year
the relevant population will be lower by 180
thousand people, i.e. there will be 90 thousand
fewer people working. Consequently, the
employment-related revenues of the state will
decline by HUF 100–120 billion annually.
Developments opposite to the above can be
experienced if the number of children grows. PUBLIC FINANCES
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